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Comments
RECOVERY AGAINST A DECEDENT'S ESTATE FOR SERVICES
RENDERED HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME:
THE MISSOURI VIEW
I.

INTRODUCTION

A problem that has arisen frequently in Missouri is one in which one person
renders some form of services, usually of a personal nature, to another and the
recipient dies without having made payment 'for those services. The person
rendering the services is then left with a claim against the recipient's estate.
Often this claim is challenged by the administrator or executor. The purpose of
this comment is to explore some of the problems that arise in the course of the
resulting litigation.
II. GENmuL RULE
A. Distinction Between Stranger and Family Relationship
The Missouri courts distinguish between recovery by one who is in a family
relationship with the decedent and one who is a stranger to him. Whether recovery
will be allowed depends in part on the relationship. Therefore, an understanding
of the nature and effect of the distinction is essential.'
The general rule in Missouri is:
[W]here one performs services for another, at the latter's request, but
without any agreement or understanding as to remuneration, the law
implies a promise on the part of the party requesting the services to
-pay the just and reasonable value thereof; but where the services are
rendered to each other by members of a family, living as one household,
no such implication will arise from mere rendition and acceptance of
the services. In such cases the law presumes that the services are rendered
gratuitously, casting upon the party claiming compensation therefor the
burden of rebutting such presumption.2
1. 2 LLMBAUGI, MISSOURI PRAcricE § 781.
2. Wood v. Estate of Lewis, 183 Mo. App. 553, 562, 167 S.W. 666, 668 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1914). Manning v. Driscoll's Estate, 174 S.W.2d 921, 923 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1943). Cf. Embry v. Martz' Estate, 377 S.W.2d 367 (Mo. 1964); Steva v.
Steva, 332 S.W.2d 924 (Mo. 1960); Muench v. South Side Nat'l Bank, 251 S.W.2d
1 (Mo. 1952); Wells v. Goff, 361 Mo. 1188, 239 S.W.2d 301 (1951); Chandler v.
Hulen, 335 Mo. 167, 71 S.W.2d 752 (1934); Lillard v. Wilson, 178 Mo. 145, 77
S.W. 74 (1903); In re Winschell's Estate, 393 S.W.2d 71 (Spr. Mo. App. 1965);
Boyher v. Gearhart's Estate, 367 S.W.2d 1 (St. L. Mo. App. 1963); Sevier v.
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In applying this rule, the Missouri courts have also distinguished between

(1) express contracts, (2) contracts implied in fact and (3) contracts implied
in law. An express contract exists if the parties declare its terms orally or by a
writing at the time it is entered. A contract implied in fact arises when a person
performs services or furnishes goods at another's request and there is no express
agreement to pay therefor, but the circumstances are such that a promise to
pay the reasonable value thereof may be inferred from the circumstances, situation, conduct and relationship of the parties.3 A contract implied in law is imposed without promise or intent by the party to be bound. The assent is legal
fiction and the liability created thereunder rests in reason and justice.4 Therefore, if there has been no request and valuable services or goods are knowingly
accepted by the party benefiting therefrom under circumstances which would
reasonably justify the belief that the party furnishing them expected payment
to the extent of their reasonable value, the obligation to pay will be implied
by law.5
The importance of this distinction becomes clear when one considers the
procedural effect of the family relationship rule. When services are rendered to
a stranger, even without agreement, the burden of proof is on the party accepting the services to prove that they were rendered gratuitously or the contract
will be implied by law.8 In other words, proof by the plaintiff of rendition of
valuable services and acceptance by the deceased makes out a prima fade case
and the defendant has the burden of proving the services were gratuitous. On
Staple's Estate, 309 S.W.2d 706 (K.C. Mo. App. 1957); Trask v. Davis, 297
S.W.2d 792 (Spr. Mo. App. 1957); Vosburg v. Smith, 272 S.W.2d 297 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1954); Farris v. Fais' Estate, 212 S.W.2d 71 (K.C. Mo. App. 1948); Trantham v. Gullic, 201 S.W.2d 522 (Spr. Mo. App. 1947); Offord v. Jenner's Estate,
189 S.W.2d 173 (St. L. Mo. App. 1945); Witte v. Smith, 237 Mo. App. 639, 152
S.W.2d 661 (Spr. Ct. App. 1941); Liebaart v. Hoehle's Estate, 111 S.W.2d 925
(St. L. Mo. App. 1938); Patrick v. Crank, 110 S.W.2d 381 (K.C. Mo. App. 1937);
Whistler v. Bond, 87 S.W.2d 237 (St. L. Mo. App. 1935); Taylor v. Currie's
Estate, 83 S.W.2d 194 (St. L. Mo. App. 1935); Gamblin v. Wells' Estate, 75
S.W.2d 862 (St. L. Mo. App. 1934); Love v. Richardson, 61 S.W.2d 220 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1933); Broyles v. Byrne, 13 S.W.2d 560 (St. L. Mo. App. 1929);
Wharton v. Denny, 222 Mo. App. 260, 296 S.W. 183 (K.C. Mo. App. 1927); Smarr
v. Smarr's Estate, 283 S.W. 461 (K.C. Mo. App. 1926); Shern v. Sims, 258 S.W.
1029 (K.C. Mo. App. 1924); Baker v. Lyell, 210 Mo. App. 230, 242 S.W. 703 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1922); Smith v. Estate of Davis, 206 Mo. App. 446, 230 S.W. 670
(Spr. Ct. App. 1921); Nelson v. Poorman's Estate, 215 S.W. 753 (St. L. Mo. App.
1919); Bowman v. Shelton, 175 Mo. App. 696, 158 S.W. 404 (St. L. Ct. App.
1913); Hyde v. Honiter, 175 Mo. App. 583, 158 S.W. 83 (St. L. Ct. App. 1913);
Crowley v. Dagley, 174 Mo. App. 561, 161 S.W. 366 (K.C. Ct. App. 1913); Birch
v. Birch, 112 Mo. App. 157, 86 S.W. 1106 (St. L. Ct. App. 1905); Shannon v.
Carter, 99 Mo. App. 134, 72 S.W. 495 (St. L. Ct. App. 1903); Sloan v. Dale, 90
Mo. App. 87 (K.C. Ct. App. 1901); Brock v. Cox, 38 Mo. App. 40 (K.C. Ct. App.
1889); Ronsiek v. Boverschmidt's Adn'r, 63 Mo. App. 421 (St. L. Ct. App. 1895).
3. Farris v. Faris' Estate, 212 S.W.2d 71, 74 (K.C. Mo. App. 1948).
4. Bennett v. Adams, 362 S.W2d 277, 281 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962).
5. Supra note 3.
6. Lillard v. Wilson, 178 Mo. 145, 77 S.W. 74 (1903); Thomas v. Fitzgerald's Estate, 297 S.W. 425 (Spr. Mo. App. 1927); Wharton v. Denny, 222 Mo.
App. 260, 296 S.W. 183 (K.C. Ct. App. 1927).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss2/6

2

266

Bowles: Bowles: Recovery against a Decendent's

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

the other hand, when a family relationship exists between the plaintiff and
deceased, then, prima facie, the services are presumed to be gratuitous and
the burden is on the plaintiff to rebut the presumption. 7 In order to rebut the
presumption of gratuity, the plaintiff must show by clear and convincing evidence
either an express contract or such facts and circumstances from which a mutual
agreement that the services were to be remunerated may be inferred. 8 Therefore
one in a family relationship who is seeking recovery for services rendered to the
decedent may do so only upon an express contract or a contract implied in fact.9
Smith v. Estate of Davis'0 summarizies Missouri's view on recovery by one in a
family relationship on a contract implied in law as follows:
If we read these cases correctly, there is never a recovery by a member
of a family (i.e. one in a family relationship) owing a duty on what is
technically termed an implied contract in law, but as stated before, the
recovery must be upon an express contract, or from evidence from which
it can be reasonably concluded that there was a distinct understanding
and agreement, understood an [sic] acted upon between the parties, a
contract established on inference rather than implication.
B. Dead Man's Statute

A major problem in proof for a plaintiff in a family relationship is the
Dead Man's Statute.' 1 The only way that the plaintiff who is in a family relationship to the decedent may recover for his services is to prove an express
or implied agreement to rebut the presumption of gratuity that attaches to the
services by virtue of the family relationship. But the Dead Man's Statute
prohibits the plaintiffs testifying as to any agreement with the deceased. As
a result, plaintiff will have a difficult time showing his intent to charge for
the services and deceased's intent to pay. 12
7. Muench v. South Side Nat'l Bank, 251 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1952); Chandler
v. Hulen, 335 Mo. 167, 71 S.W.2d 752 (1934); Lillard v. Wilson, supra note 6;
In re Winschell's Estate, 393 S.W.2d 71 (Spr. Mo. App. 1965); Boyher v. Gearhart's Estate, 367 S.W.2d 1 (St. L. Mo. App. 1963); Trask v. Davis, 297 S.W.2d
792 (Spr. Mo. App. 1957); Vosburg v. Smith, 272 S.W.2d 297 (Spr. Mo. App.
1954); Trantham v. Gullic, 201 S.W.2d 522 (Spr. Mo. App. 1947); Witte v.
Smith, 237 Mo. App. 639, 152 S.W.2d 661 (Spr. Ct. App. 1941); Liebaart v.
Hoehle's Estate, 111 S.W.2d 925 (St. L. Mo. App. 1938); Broyles v. Byrne, 13
S.W.2d 560 (St. L. Mo. App. 1929); Brunnert v. Boeckmann's Estate, 258 S.W.
768 (K.C. Ct. App. 1924); Baker v. Lyell, 210 Mo. App. 230, 242 S.W. 703 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1922); Smith v. Estate of Davis, 206 Mo. App. 446, 230 S.W. 670
(Spr. Ct. App. 1921); Wood v. Estate of Lewis, supra note 2; Hyde v. Honiter, 175
Mo. App. 583, 158 S.W. 83 (St. L. Ct. App. 1913); Crowley v. Dagley, 174 Mo.
App. 561, 161 S.W. 366 (K.C. Ct. App. 1913); Birch v. Birch, 112 Mo. App.
157, 86 S.W. 1106 (St. L. Ct. App. 1905); Shannon v. Carter, 99 Mo. App. 134,
72 S.W. 495 (St. L. Ct. App. 1903).
8. Cases cited note 7 supra.
9. Birch v. Birch, supra note 7.
10. 206 Mo. App. 446, 459, 230 S.W. 670, 673 (Spr. Ct. App. 1921).
11. § 491.010, RSMo 1959.
12. In re Winschel's Estate, 393 S.W.2d 71, 75 (Spr. Mo. App. 1965).
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Yosburg v. Smitz' s is a prime example of the difficulties caused by a combination of the presumed gratuity and the Dead Man's Statute. In that case,
plaintiff took her mother into her home although there were four other children
in the family. Due to the mother's condition, the personal services rendered her
by the plaintiff were of a most distasteful and onerous nature. Plaintiff clearly
was deserving since she was the only child in the family who rendered this
onerous care to the mother, and she was able to prove her agreement. But she
was only able to do so by third parties' testimony as to what they saw of the
services rendered to the deceased by the plaintiff and what deceased said to them
about compensating the plaintiff for those services, from which the court was
able to infer an agreement between plaintiff and the deceased for compensation.
Without the good fortune of having third party witnesses, plaintiff could not
have recovered.
The plaintiff in Farris zy. Fai?" Estate14 was less fortunate. Plaintiff pleaded
an express contract. The evidence produced through third party witnesses was
insufficient for the court to infer a contract and was not sufficient to support
an express contract to provide for the plaintiff in her will. In commenting upon
this situation, the court said:
However deserving claimant in this case may be; however valuable his
services were; however regretable that clear and convincing evidence is
not available to establish whether any contract or understanding existed
between claimant and the deceased -for compensation, and if any, what it
was, the court cannot disregard the presumption which the law imposes
for the protection of the estate of a deceased person; nor can the court
itself create an express contract between the parties, nor infer that one
existed without sufficient facts in evidence; nor can the court herein
assume and enforce a testamentary provision which the deceased herself
failed to make.' 5
Of course, a court cannot infer a contract where none exists, but it is very
harsh to make a deserving claimant's right to recover depend on the fortuitous
circumstances of third parties being present at opportune times in order that
they may testify as to facts from which an agreement may be inferred.
To recover, the plaintiff must rebut the presumption that the services are
gratuitous and the Dead Man's Statute effectively prevents him from offering
the best evidence he has to do it. It is unrealistic to think that the jury will
not be aware of his interest in proving the agreement and consider this when
weighing his testimony. It would be more just to allow this factor to go to the
weight of plaintiff's testimony rather than to exclude it altogether.' 6

13. Supra note 7.
14. Supra note 3.
15. 212 S.W.2d 71, at 77.
16. McCoRMICK, EVIENcE § 65 (1954); 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 578, 578(a)
(1940); 7 WiemoRE, EVIDENCE § 2065 (1940); Ray, The Dead Man's Statute--A
Relic of the Past, 9 Sw. LJ.390 (1956); Comment, The "Administration Disqualifcation" of Missouri's Dead Man Statute, 6 ST. Louis U.LJ. 413 (1961).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss2/6
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D. Factors Comidered

1. Statements by Deceased to Third Parties
What are some of the sufficient facts and circumstances from which the court
will infer an agreement between the plaintiff and the decedent? The evidence
that seems most persuasive to the courts is statements by the deceased to third
parties showing an intent to pay the person rendering the services. 17 The courts
also place much emphasis on the plaintiff's having been present when these
statements were made to the third party;'S for while plaintiff must show that
the deceased intended to pay, he must also show that he intended to charge
for the services at the time they were rendered. 19 Services intended as a gratuity
may not afterwards be turned into a charge.20 Since plaintiff cannot testify as
to the transactions with the deceased due to the Dead Man's Statute,21 the
best proof of his intent to charge is his presence and acquiescence when the deceased expressed an intent to compensate the plaintiff. This is also the only way
that plaintiff may show that deceased was aware of his intent to charge for the
services and that he was aware of deceased's intent to pay for them, thereby
satisfying the requirement that there must be a mutual intent on the part of
the deceased to compensate and plaintiff to be compensated for the services. 22
A mere intent on the part of the deceased to bestow a bounty or a gratuity
on the plaintiff is not sufficient to establish an agreement. The statements to
the third party by the deceased must show an intent on the part of the deceased
23
to compensate for valuable services rendered him.
2. Relinquishing Home or Job to Perform Services
In Smith v. Estate of Davis2U the court said that where the claimant gave
up a home or other employment and went to live with a parent or other party
from whom remuneration is sought, or where such party went to live in the

17. Kopp v. Traders Gate City Nat'l Bank, 210 S.W.2d 490 (Mo. 1948);
Chandler v. Hulen, supra note 7; Liebaart v. Hoehle's Estate, swpra note 7; Hyde
v. Honiter, supra note 7; Crowley v. Dagley, supra note 7.
18. See, e.g., Kopp v. Traders Gate City Nat'l Bank, supra note 17; Vosburg
v. Smith, supra note 7; Offord v. Jenner's Estate, 189 S.W.2d 173 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1945); Liebaart v. Hoehle's Estate, supra note 7 (In Liebaart, the court
emphasizes that the plaintiff was not present when the statements of the deceased
were made to the witnesses.)
19. Supra note 17.
20. Tranthamr v. Gullic, supra note 7.
21. Supra note 11.
22. Supra note 17.
23. Id.
24. 206 Mo. App. 446, 462, 230 S.W. 670, 673 (Spr. Ct. App. 1921). Cf. I n re
Winschel's Estate, supra note 12; Liebaart v. Hoehle's Estate, supra note 7; Koch
v. Hebel, 32 Mo. App. 103 (K.C. Ct. App. 1888). But see Weir v. Carter's Estate,
224 S.W. 147 (St. L, Ct. App. 1920), wherein the court did not regard the fact
that the plaintiff worked out of home and returned periodically to be such an
interruption of the family relationship as to rebut the presumption that the services
rendered by her to the decedent were gratuitous.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966
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home of the claimant and it is shown that such party was receiving valuable
services as a result of the changed relationship, much less evidence will be required for the court to infer a remunerative relation than in those cases where the
claimant was himself the recipient of a home and other benefits of the family
relationship.
3. Nature of Services
Another factor considered by the courts is the nature of the services rendered to the deceased by the plaintiff. Often the services for which compensation is sought were very distasteful and onerous. Many times the person receiving the services was old and quite ill and had lost control of bodily functions
making nursing, cleaning and laundry services particularly burdensome and
unpleasant. 25 In cases where the services were of this nature, the court is more
inclined to find an agreement between the parties that the services were to be
compensated than in the case of more nominal services.
4. Attitude of Parties toward One Another
Even though the parties were living in an ostensible family relationship, the
attitude of the parties toward each other may indicate that any services provided by one to the other were rendered pursuant to an agreement for compensation. In Taylor v. Hssdson2 s the plaintiff was a niece of the decedent, Mrs.
Kerby. In 1898, Mr. and Mrs. Kerby requested plaintiff to come to their home
and care for them, as both were in declining health. During Mr. Kerby's life,
he clothed plaintiff, sent her to school for two years, and bought her a piano.
In general, he treated her as one of his own family. After he died, the plaintiff
expressed an intent to leave, but was persuaded by Mrs. Kerby to remain. During
the next ten years, Mrs. Kerby furnished no clothing for the plaintiff, nor did
she pay her anything. The court found that although Mr. Kerby clearly regarded
plaintiff as a member of the family, Mrs. Kerby did not so regard or treat the
plaintiff. The court said:
If plaintiff was regarded by Mrs. Kerby as a member of her family we
are at a loss to know why during all the years of faithful attendance to her
wants, and services rendered for her, Mrs. Kerby did not treat her as
such, by providing her clothing and other things customary in the family
relation. And it is incredible that plaintiff under such circumstances would
27
have rendered the service without the expectation of some compensation.
The court held that statements by Mrs. Kerby to third parties that plaintiff
would be amply provided for and the conduct of the parties was sufficient to
show an implied (in fact) 28 contract that plaintiff was to receive pay for her
services.
25.
note 18;
26.
27.
28.

See, e.g., Vosburg v. Smith, supra note 7; Offord v. Jenner's Estate, supra
Patrick v. Crank, 110 S.W.2d 381 (K.C. Mo. App. 1937).
145 Mo. App. 377, 129 S.W. 261 (K.C. Ct. App. 1910).
Id. at 381, 129 S.W. at 261.
Parentheses added.
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E. Family Relationship
1. Definitions
Taylor v. Hudson29 also illustrates the troublesome and difficult problem of
defining what constitutes a family relationship, and determining whether it exists
from a given set of facts. As illustrated by Taylor, the mere existence of relationship by consanguinity or affiinity does not conclusively establish a family relationship between the parties as that term is used in law.30 Mrs. Kerby was a blood
relative of plaintiff while Mr. Kerby was not, yet the court held that Mrs.
Kerby did not regard or treat plaintiff as being in a family relationship.
Lillard v. Wilson3 l states that the reason for the family relationship rule is:
* * * that the household family relationship is presumed to abound in
reciprocal acts of kindness and good will which tends to mutual comfort
and convenience of the family; and the rule stated applies not only to
members of a family who are related by blood, but to those distantly
related, and to those who are in fact not related at all, provided they
live together as members of one family.
In Steva v. Stevr, 32 the court states the generally accepted definition of family
relationship as: "a collective body of persons under one head and one domestic
government, who have reciprocal, natural, or moral duties to support and care
3
for each other."

29. Supra note 26.
30. Supra note 26. Cf. Steva v. Steva, 332 S.W.2d 924 (Mo. 1960) (relation
of sister-in-law did not, of itself, establish a family relationship); Lillard v. Wilson,
supra note 6 (son not in family relationship); Boyher v. Gearhart's Estate, supra
note 7 (consanguinity or affinity not sufficient by itself to show a family relationship, therefore relationship of uncle-niece did not, of itself, show a family relationship); Patrick v. Crank, sp..ra note 25 (relationship of brother-sister or auntniece not conclusive as to existence of family relationship); Birch v. Birch, supra
note 7 (niece and nephew of deceased held not to be in a family relationship to
him); Truesdail v. Truesdail's Ex'r, 72 Mo. App. 155 (St. L. Ct. App. 1897)
(mother-in-law not in family relationship with daughter-in-law).
31. 178 Mo. 145, 153, 77 S.W. 74, 75 (1903).
32. Supra note 30, at 926. Cf. Embry v. Martz' Estate, 377 S.W.2d 367 (Mo.
1964); Boyher v. Gearhart's Estate, supra note 7; Sevier v. Staples' Estate, 309
S.W.2d 706 (K.C. Mo. App. 1957); Hyde v. Honiter, supra note 7. For other
definitions of family relationship used by the Missouri courts, see Brunnert v.
Boeckmann's Estate, supra note 7; Birch v. Birch, supra note 7.
33. See, e.g., Wells v. Goff, 361 Mo. 1188, 239 S.W.2d 301 (1951) (man and
woman living as husband and wife, but not married. The Missouri Supreme Court
held that although the relationship was meretricious, the parties were living in a
family relationship.); Trantham v. Gullic, supra note 7 (father-in-law and daughterin-law); Manning v. Driscoll's Estate, 174 S.W.2d 921 (St. L. Mo. App. 1943)
(man and woman living together, but not married. The court said that no one
could read the evidence and come to any other conclusion but that the parties
were living in a family relationship.); Liebaart v. Hoehle's Estate, supra note 7
(.father-daughter); Weir v. Carter's Estate, 224 S.W. 147 (St. L. Mo. App. 1920)
(child in foster home); Nelson v. Poorman's Estate, 215 S.W. 753 (St. L. Mo. App.
1919) (child in foster home held to -be in a family relationship with foster parents,
although never adopted); Wood v. Estate of Lewis, supra note 2 (cousins held to
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The cases cited in footnotes 30 and 33 supra indicate that the important
factor in establishing a family relationship is not blood relationship, but whether
the parties did in fact live as one family as defined in Steva and other cases
cited in note 32. Each case, therefore, calls for a determination on its own particular facts. The Missouri courts have held that family relationship is a mixed
question of law and fact and if the relationship clearly exists, the trial court
should rule on it as a matter of law, but if there is any doubt as to its existence,
the issue should be submitted to the jury under proper instructions.3 4
2. Jury Instruction
Just what is a proper instruction has not been fully clarified. Many of the
instructions that have been approved by the courts summarize the evidence to
such an extent and are so verbose as to be more hinderance than help to a jury.
An example of such an instruction is found in 2 Rayinond's Missouri Instructions
Section 4722.35 A better instruction is one found in Embry v. Marte' Estate.3 6
That instruction sets out the rules in Missouri for recovery in cases of a family
relationship and does not summarize the evidence. But that instruction also has
vices which could be eleminated. The instruction tells the jury that if a family
relationship exists, certain presumptions apply; and if it does not, other presumptions are applicable to the facts.
Instructions in these cases could be much improved and simplified by wholly
eliminating any reference to presumptions. The jury should be given the definition of family relationship as set out in Steva and then told that if they find that
such relationship exists, they must find an agreement between plaintiff and deceased that the services were to be compensated in order to allow plaintiff a
recovery. However, if they find that no such relationship exists, then plaintiff
may recover upon proof of rendition of valuable services and deceased's acceptance of the same, unless the defendant persuades them that the services were
rendered gratuitously. This will enable the jury to find exactly what it would have
to find under the old instructions, and it avoids confusing the jury with verbiage
summarizing the evidence and with presumptions which are often troublesome to
lawyers and judges themselves.
3. Burden of Proof
In submitting family relationship cases to the jury, the problem of burden
of proof on the various issues arises. As stated above, in the absence of a family
relationship, once the plaintiff shows that he rendered valuable services to the
be living in a family relationship); Hyde v. Honiter, supra note 7 (grandmothergranddaughter); Brock v. Cox, 38 Mo. App. 40 (K.C. Ct. App. 1889) (mother
and daughter held to be living in a family relationship).
34. Manning v. Driscoll's Estate, supra note 33; Wood v. Estate of Lewis,
supra note 2; Hyde v. Honiter, supra note 7; Birch v. Birch, swpra note 7.
35. 2 RAyMoND, MissouRi INsTRucrIoNs § 4722 (1942). The instruction was
taken from Love v. Richardson, 61 S.W.2d 220 (St. L. Mo. App. 1933).
36. 377 S.W.2d 367, 368 (Mo. 1964). The reference is to Instructions 1 and 3.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss2/6
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deceased which the latter accepted, the burden is upon the defendant to show
that the services were gratuitous 3 7 But if a family relationship is established, the
presumption of gratuity attaches to the services and the burden of proof shifts to
the plaintiff to show that the services were to be compensated 38 In order for the
defendant to shift the burden of proof on the issue of compensation to the plaintiff, he must prove the existence of a family relationship. In Missouri, family relationship is in the nature of an affirmative defense, and must be pleaded and
proved by the defendant.89
F. Problem of Wagner v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co.A Third Classifcation
One troublesome problem in Missouri is the language in Wagner v. Ediron
Elec. Illuminating Co.4 o indicating an extension of the presumption of gratuity to
cases other than those involving a family relationship. Hyde v. Honiter4l sets out
the formulation of the rule that the courts have drawn from Wagner:
It has been held that where the family relation does not exist, relationship either by consanguinity or affinity alone is not sufficient to raise a
presumption that beneficial services rendered and accepted
are gratuitous,
42
except where the relation is that of parent and child.
However this may be, our courts have held that, even where no ties of
kinship exist between the parties, the fact that they stand in any peculiar
relation to each other may have a very important bearing upon the presumptions arising in the case and the burden of proof; for whenever the
relationship of the parties is such as to lead a reasonable person to believe
that the services are performed gratuitously, then the presumption is indulged that they are not to be paid for and the burden is cast upon the
party asserting the claim to overcome this presumption. It is said that
"this principle is not confined to the family relation, but finds appropriate
application as well in all cases where the relations of the parties are
sufficient, according to the experience and customs of men, to invoke its
influence as a result of reason and natural justice." 43
44
This statement by the court, which has been repeated in several other cases,
leaves the impression that there is a third class, neither family relationship nor
stranger, which will be covered by the presumption of gratuity.

37. Supra note 6.
38. Supra note 7.
39. Muench v. South Side Nat'l Bank, 251 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo. 1952).
40. 141 Mo. App. 51, 121 S.W. 329 (St. L. Ct. App. 1909).
41. Supra note 7.
42. 175 Mo. App. at 598, 158 S.W. at 87. But see note 30 supra indicating
that the relationship of parent-child is not enough of itself to raise the -presumption of gratuity, unless they live in a family relationship as defined in law. This
seems to be the better view.
43. 175 Mo. App. at 598, 158 S.W. at 88 (St. 'L. Ct. App. 1913).
44 E.g., Boyher v. Gearhart's Estate, supra note 7; Trantham v. Gullic, supra
note 7; Patrick v. Crank, supra note 25; Taylor v. Currie's Estate, 83 S.W.2d 194
(St. L. Mo. App. 1935); Wharton v. Denny, supra note 6; Shern v. Sims, 258 S.W.
1029 (K.C. Mo. App. 1924); Wood v. Estate of Lewis, supra note 2.
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There are several things wrong with this view. The statement was dictum
in the Hyde case which has been the case cited for the application of the Wagner
statement to this type of case. In that case, the court found the existence of the
family relationship and the statement quoted above was a makeweight argument.
The only case of which the author is aware in which this statement from Hyde
has been made the basis of the court's decision is Taylor v. CUrrle's Estate.4 5
In the other cases cited in note 44 supra, the statement was not made the basis
of the decision, nor was it necessary for the decision. In Taylor, the services in
question were rendered by one old friend, Mr. Taylor, to another, Mr. Currie.
Subsequent to the rendition of the services, there was a falling out between the two.
After the death of Mr. Currie, Mr. Taylor sought recovery from the estate for
the services, which consisted mostly of handling the deceased's stocks and bonds,
as Taylor was a salesman for a brokerage house. Upon occasion, the deceased
had allowed Taylor to pledge certain of the bonds as collateral for loans. Neither
party ever made any charge upon the other. While the court used the Hyde rule
as the basis for its decision, the case could have been decided on the simple
ground that the evidence showed that plaintiff had no intent to charge when the
services were rendered. There is a well-established rule that services intended as a
gratuity may not afterwards be turned into a charge 40 There were sufficient facts
for such a finding without resort to the use of a presumption. Another equally
good basis upon which the case could have been decided would have been that
conceding for the moment that plaintiff did intend to charge for the services when
they were rendered, the use of deceased's bonds as collateral without charge
was a sufficient consideration for the services rendered to the deceased by the
plaintiff; therefore, plaintiff was not entitled to additional compensation from the
estate.
The vice of using the above rule is that it places the presumption of gratuity
on the plaintiff when it should not be so placed. In attempting to explain the
rule as set out in the Hyde case, the Kansas City Court of Appeals said in
Patrick v. Crank:47
Our understanding of the rule . . . is that if one performs valuable serv-

ices for another, which the other receives, the law presumes an intention
on the part of the performer to charge therefor and the receiver to pay
the reasonable value thereof. However, that presumption of the law takes
flight when it is shown that a peculiar relationship exists between the
parties, such as that of a family relationship, or, where there are other
circumstances tending to show that the services rendered (even though
by a stranger) were voluntarily performed or were made without the expectation of pay.
This statement goes more properly to the rule that services rendered without
expectation of compensation may not later be made a charge.48 It must be re45.
46.
47.
48.

Supra note 44.
Trantham v. Gullic, supra note 25, at 527.
Sipra note 25, at 385.
Supra note 46.
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membered that the basic rule in this area is a presumption that valuable services
were rendered under an agreement for compensation and the defendant has the
burden of proving that they were gratuitous 49 If a family relationship is established by the defendant, then the burden is upon the plaintiff to show an agreement between the parties that the services were to be compensated.' 0 If there are
facts and circumstances other than a family relationship that indicate that the
services were rendered by the plaintiff without an intent to be paid therefor, it is
more properly an element of the defendant's burden of proof that the services
were gratuitous than a basis for shifting the burden of proof on that issue to the
plaintiff. Due to the Dead Man's Statute, 51 the plaintiff has a difficult enough
problem in getting his proof before the court without adding to his burden of proof
unnecessarily. Only by a showing of a family relationship between the parties
should the defendant be able to rid himself of the burden of proof that valuable
services were rendered gratuitously.
Another reason for not applying the rule as stated in Hyde is that the statement from Wagner upon which the Hyde court based its rule was not intended
to apply to cases of this nature. In Wagner, plaintiff represented Missouri Electric
Light and Power Co. on a committee set up by the various St. Louis power companies to supervise the laying of conduit in an area of the city as required by
ordinance. Plaintiff was elected supervising engineer of the work by the committee
with defendant's representative dissenting. Plaintiff then sued the defendant for
compensation as supervising engineer of the project. Plaintiff represented two
companies besides Missouri Electric Light and Power Co. on the committee and
the defendant argued that plaintiff was being paid by them for his work and
therefore had no claim against the defendant. Plaintiff claimed that the services
were for all parties and were over and above his duties as representative on the
committee for which his employers paid him. The relationship between the parties
in this case was master-servant, a much different one than exists in the cases to
which the rule was transposed by the court in Hyde.
In the quote from Hyde set out above, the court included this statement from
Wagner:

The principle is not confined to the family relation. It finds appropriate
application as well in all cases where the relations of the parties are sufficient, according to the experience and customs of
men, to invoke its influence as a result of reason and natural justice. 52
Had the court included the next sentence in Wagner in its quote, the type of case
to which the rule was intended to apply would have been indicated. That sentence
reads:
49. Supra note 6.
50. Snpra note 7.
51. Supra note 11.
52. Wagner v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., supra note 40, at 71, 121 S.W.
at 335. Quoted in Hyde v. Honiter, 175 Mo. App. 583, 598, 158 S.W. 83, 88 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1913).
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For instance, the officers of incorporated companies, such as bank presidents and cashiers, are expected, of course, to perform all necessary services
to the bank, incident to the office they hold, in consideration of the salary
they receive for executing such offices. In view of this relation, the law presumes generally that all services performed by such officers are performed
capacity and as within the duties of the particular office
by them in the
53
they occupy.
This statement indicates that the Wagner court was not considering the application of this rule to cases involving decedents' estates. Therefore, because the rule
is not appropriate to this area and was not intended to be by the court that stated
it, it is hoped that in the future the courts will limit its application to those cases
to which it was intended to apply by the Wagner court.
III. CoNTRAcr TO COMPENSATE BY BEQUEST OF ENTirm ESTATE
If either a stranger or one who is in a family relationship to the deceased
seeks recovery for breach of a contract for compensation by a bequest of deceased's net estate, another set of interesting problems arises. Proof of a contract
for compensation will rebut the presumption of gratuity attaching to services
rendered by one in a family relationship, 5 so both strangers to deceased and those
in a family relationship to deceased are treated alike in allowing recovery under
such a contract.
The plaintiff seeking recovery under such a contract will first have the problem of what form of action he should use, and second, the problem of the Statute
of Wills 55 and the Statute of Frauds. 6
Plaintiff's contract with deceased may have been breached either by failure
of deceased to make a will, or by failure of deceased to provide for plaintiff in
the will as agreed. In either case, plaintiff has three forms of action from which
to choose.

A. Suit on Express Contract
Plaintiff's first alternative is to sue the administrator57 at law for damages
due to deceased's breach, the measure of damages being the contract price.6 8 This
alternative has not been successful in Missouri. The Statute of Frauds is not a

53. Wagner v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., -rupra note 40, at 71, 121 S.W.
at 335.
54. Supra note 7.
55. § 474.320, RSMo 1959.
56. § 432.010, RSMo 1959.
57. If the deceased had made a will, the person that the plaintiff would sue
would be the executor. For purposes of simplicity, the term administrator will be
used to include both.
58. Muench v. South Side Nail Bank, 251 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1952); Ver Standig
v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 228 Mo. App. 1242, 62 S.W.2d 1094 (St. L. Ct. App.
1933); Taylor v. Hudson, 145 Mo. App. 377, 129 S.W. 261 (K.C. Ct. App. 1910);
Hall v. Getman, 121 Mo. App. 630, 97 S.W. 607 (K.C. Ct. App. 1906).
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bar since plaintiff's performance takes the contract out of the Statute,5 9 but the
Statute of Wills is another matter. Missouri has held that in an action at law a
parol agreement to make a will may no more act as one than a parol will. The
contract may not be enforced in an action at law, and may only be used to
limit the amount the plaintiff may recover in quantum meruit for the reasonable
value of his services. 60 In Hall v. Getman, the court said that to permit the plaintiff to recover the estimated value of the property promised plaintiff in the contract would be a flagrant violation of the Statute of Wills.61
The main reason given by the courts in Missouri for not allowing recovery
in an action at law for breach of contract is a lack of an adequate measure of damages. 62 In Muenck v. Soutlk Side Nat'l Bank, the court said:
It seems to be conceded by everyone that there could be no recovery on a
suit for damages -for breach of the contract because of ... the impossibility of proving the net value of the estate to 6which
amount plaintiff's
3
recovery would be limited in that kind of a suit.

The reason that the measure of damages is inadequate at law is best set out in
64

Whitwortk v. Monahan's Estate:

This, of course, for the obvious reason that such a contract not only
calls for the subsequent performance of services by the one party which
at the time are necessarily but speculative and contingent as to their extent and value, but what is more important, it also provides a consideration which is'equally indefinite and speculative, in that neither contracting party can possibly know at the time of entering into the agreement
what the ultimate net value of the estate will be. Furthermore, were the
one party, even after he has performed under the contract, to be allowed
to maintain an action at law upon it for damages growing out of the other
party's breach of the contract, it would neither be feasible nor proper to
attempt to estimate the net value of the estate until the time for proving demands against the estate had expired, since in all possibility the
witnesses might err in their statements or estimates of the amount and
character of the indebtedness of the estate, with the inevitable consequence that the burden of such mistakes would be thereby imposed upon
the creditors of the estate in direct violation of the evident meaning of
the contract.
Reigldey v. Fabricus' Estate6 5 is a case in which recovery was allowed at
law for the breach of contract to provide for plaintiff by bequest. While at first
appearance this seems to be contra to the above rule, in Reigldey there was a
standard by which damages could be measured. The contract that was alleged in
59. Hall v. Getman, supra note 58.
60. Id.
61. 121 Mo. App. at 639, 97 S.W. at 610.
62. Muench v. South Side Nat'l Bank, supra note 58; Sharkey v. McDermott,
91 Mo. 647, 4 S.W. 107 (1887); Whitworth v. Monahan's Estate, 111 S.W.2d 931
(St. L. Mo. App. 1938).
63. 251 S.W.2d at 4.
64. 111 S.W.2d at 932.
65. 332 S.W.2d 76 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966

13

19661

MissouriCOMMENTS
Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [1966], Art. 6

Reighley was that deceased was to compensate the plaintiff by "making provision
in her Will, giving, devising, and bequeathing to plaintiff sufficient money and
property so as to compensate fairly, reasonably and adequately for the services
which she, plaintiff, performed." 66 Therefore, although plaintiff was allowed to recover at law on the contract, her measure of damages in reality was nothing more
than the reasonable value of her services which she could have recovered in
67
quantum meruit, which the Missouri courts allow in these cases.
B. Quantum Meruit
While plaintiff cannot ordinarily recover on the contract promising compensation by will, he may abandon the contract and sue the administrator at law in
quantum meruit for the reasonable value of the services rendered deceased.6 8 As
pointed out above, a plaintiff in a family relationship cannot recover in quantum
meruit for the services due to the necessity of proving an agreement to overcome
the presumption of gratuity. But if the plaintiff does show that agreement, thereby
overcoming the presumption, he may then elect to abandon the contract and sue
in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of those services.69
In a case such as this, the Statute of Wills would be no bar to recovery, since
it is not based on the contract. The Statute of Frauds will be no bar to a
stranger seeking recovery for the same reason. Some question, however, may arise
in the case of a plaintiff who is in a family relationship to the deceased since he
must prove the agreement in order to rebut the presumption of gratuity. Since
the plaintiff is proving the agreement not to recover on it, but to rebut the presumption of gratuity in order that he may then abandon the contract and seek
recovery in quantum meruit, logic would have it that the Statute of Frauds would
be no bar, since the recovery itself is not based upon the contract. But, even if
such use of the contract were held to fall within the Statute of Frauds, plaintiff's
performance of his part of the agreement would, as pointed out above, remove
it from the bar of the statute.
Until 1952, the Missouri rule as given in Hall v. Getmant ° was that in a case
where the plaintiff was promised the net estate by will as compensation for the
services rendered the deceased, although the plaintiff could not recover on the
contract for its breach, the net value of the estate would be the limit of his recovery in quantum meruit.71 However, in 1952, the Missouri Supreme Court in

66. Id. at 78.
67. Supra note 58.
68. Muench v. South Side Nat'l Bank, supra note 58; Ver Standig v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co., supra note 58; Blackwell v. De Armenes Estate, 300 S.W.
1035 (St. L. Mo. App. 1928); Boldwin v. 'Lay, 226 S.W. 602 (K.C. Mo. App. 1920);
Taylor v. Hudson, supra note 58; Hall v. Getman, supra note 58.
69. Muench v. South Side Nat'l Bank, supra note 58; Taylor v. Hudson, supra
note 58; Hall v. Getman, supra note 58.
70. 121 Mo. App. at 638, 97 S.W. at 610.
71. Cf. Whitworth v. Monahan's Estate, supra note 62; Blackwell v. De
Arment's Estate, supra note 68; Boldwin v. Lay, supra note 68.
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Muench- v. South; Side Nat'l Bank 2 said that the limitation in Hail on recovery
in quantum meruit was dictum and was disapproved. The court said that plaintiff had been compelled to sue due to the deceased's default and now had abandoned the contract to recover instead the reasonable value of his services. To put
this limit on the recovery would allow the estate to profit by deceased's wrongdoing.73 Also the net value of deceased's estate, which Hall imposed as the limit
of plaintiff's recovery in quantum meruit, could not be determined until after
plaintiff's claim was disposed of, as she was also a creditor of the estate. The
court added that the net value of the estate was no easier to prove in a quantum
meruit action than in an action on the contract seeking damages for its breach.7 4
Therefore, the plaintiff may recover the reasonable value of his services in quantum
meruit without limitation to the net value of the estate.
C. Specific Performance
Due to the fact that there is an inadequate measure of damages at law,
the plaintiff may seek an equitable remedy in the form of specific performance
against the heirs of the deceased.' 5 The Missouri courts have held that the Statute
of Wills is no bar to this form of action. 76 Equity treats the contract, not as an attempted will, in which case it would fail for non-compliance with the Statute of
Wills, but rather treats it as a contract to make a will which will be enforced
since it is based on sufficient consideration, i.e. the plaintiff's services to the deceased.77 The authority of equity thus to practically enforce a will that fails
to comply with the Statute of Wills is based on the principle that equity will
treat as done that which the parties intended should have been done. 78
Furthermore, the Statute of Frauds is not a bar to specific performance. The
Missouri courts hold that such a contract, although not in writing, will be enforced in equity where it has been partially performed and the failure to complete
it would work a fraud on the claimant.7 9 Therefore, since the plaintiff has performed his part"of the contract, failure of the recipient of the services to perform
his part will work a fraud on the plaintiff and equity will specifically enforce the
agreement against the deceased's heirs.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This is an area that has many pitfalls for the unwary. Those who undertake to
perform services for another for which they expect compensation should be care-

72. 251 S.W.2d at 6.
73. Id. at 5.
74. Ibid.
75. Supra note 58.
76. Sharkey v. McDermott, sunpra note 62; Sutton v. Hayden, 62 Mo. 101
(1876); Hall v. Getman, supra note 58.
77. Ibid.
78. Sharkey v. McDermott, supra note 62; Hall v. Getman, supra note 58.
79. Sharkey v. McDermott, supra note 62; Ver Standig v. St. Louis Union
Trust Co., supra note 58; Hall v. Getman, supra note 58.
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ful to have an agreement to that effect with the recipient of the services that
can be proved without resort to the testimony of the person rendering the services.
This is particularly true if a family relationship exists between the parties to the
agreement, because it will shift the burden of proof on the issue of compensation
to the plaintiff. The rules in these cases are far easier to state than to apply, and
the courts must exercise caution to insure that a deserving plaintiff is not defeated
through an over emphasis on presumptions or by improper additions to his already heavy burden of proof.
Jmis E. BowLEs
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